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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the first to use program administrative data from Brazil’s National Employment 
System (SINE) to assess the impact of SINE job interview referrals on labor market 
outcomes. Data for a five-year period (2012–2016) are used to evaluate the impact of SINE 
on employment probability, wage rates, time until reemployment, and job tenure. Difference-
in-differences estimates suggest that a SINE job interview referral increases the probability 
of finding a job within three months of the referral and reduces the number of months to find 
reemployment, the average job tenure of the next job, and the reemployment wage. Subgroup 
analysis suggests that compared to more educated workers, SINE is more effective in helping 
less educated workers by increasing their probability of finding a job and reducing time until 
reemployment. Finally, the evidence suggests that the online labor exchange is less effective 
than in-person services provided at SINE offices.   
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This paper is the first to use program administrative data from Brazil’s National Employment 
System (SINE) to assess the impact of SINE job-interview referrals on labor market outcomes. 
We use data from a five-year period (2012‒2016) to evaluate the impact of SINE job referrals on 
reemployment, time until reemployment, job tenure, and wage rates.  Causal impact estimates 
based on propensity score matching suggest that a SINE job-interview referral increases the 
probability of finding a job within three months of the referral and reduces the number of months 
needed to find reemployment, the average job tenure of the next job, and the reemployment 
wage. Subgroup analysis suggests that SINE is particularly effective at helping less educated 
workers find work in a timely fashion. Finally, the evidence suggests that the self-service online 
labor exchange works less well than the in-person job interview referrals provided at SINE 
offices.  
 
Key words: labor market policy, employment services, job interview referrals, difference-in-
differences.  
 









 Countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region faced an array of labor 
market problems in the 1990s, including high unemployment, poor working conditions, and a 
lack of quality job opportunities. This situation generated policy interest in improving labor 
market programs, especially the public labor exchange. In recent years, as labor market policy 
has become an important macroeconomic policy instrument in the LAC region, labor market 
programs have garnered a bigger share of public resources in the region and have served more 
job seekers and employers (Ramos 2002). 
In Brazil, labor markets have performed reasonably well over the past 15 years in terms 
of labor market participation and labor earnings growth. However, a recession that started in the 
second quarter of 2014 nearly doubled the unemployment rate, from an average of 6.9 percent in 
2011‒2014 to an average of 12 percent in the subsequent four years.1 The country’s National 
Employment System (SINE) is a key institution for  public employment policies and can take a 
greater role in future economic downturns.  
SINE, created in 1975, is a network of local employment offices. It serves as a go-
between, helping workers line up work and providing information to employers on available 
workers.2 The Worker Protection Fund, established in 1990, expanded SINE to 1,930 offices in 
2016, with locations throughout the country in all 26 states and the federal district. The Ministry 
 
1 According to the Brazilian Business Cycle Dating Committee (CODACE) of the Brazilian Institute of Economics 
(IBRE), the recession lasted for 11 quarters, from the second quarter of 2014 to the last quarter of 2016. 
2 SINE was created as a result of ratification by the Brazilian government of the Convention No. 88 of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), which relates to the organization of public employment services. SINE is 
also one of the means through which workers request unemployment benefits. For more details about SINE, see 





of Labor3 coordinates this large network, monitoring the decentralized delivery of services by 
states and municipalities.     
SINE customers tend to be less educated and lower skilled, but SINE also provides 
services for customers with higher educational attainment and job qualifications. In this paper, 
we estimate the program’s causal impacts on the full range of customers and analyze the effects 
of job referrals on all customers, most of whom have work histories characterized by high rates 
of turnover in formal-sector jobs.  Our estimates suggest that SINE job referrals increase the 
probability of finding a job and reduce the time to reemployment, the average tenure in the next 
job, and the reemployment wage.  Our subgroup analysis further suggests that SINE could 
broaden its impact by expanding services to more highly trained job seekers.  We find that it 
takes almost twice as long (nine weeks) to fill a skilled job vacancy in Brazil as it does on 
average (five weeks) in other LAC countries (Aedo and Walker 2012). 
Improving the effectiveness of the public employment service (PES) is essential to 
supporting quick, successful, and high-quality job matches (Betcherman et al. 2004). An 
effective PES contributes to labor-market efficiency, reducing informational breakdowns that 
slow or prevent the proper matching of job-seekers’ skills to employer job vacancies. Borges et 
al. (2017) estimate that PES labor intermediation in Brazil saved the Worker Protection Fund 
about R$43 million in 2016 through reduced unemployment insurance (UI) payments.  Since 
labor intermediation programs typically benefit low-skilled workers, countries with a large 
proportion of these job seekers could benefit from increased investment in labor exchange 
services. 
 
3 The Ministry of Labor was integrated into the Ministry of Economy following the restructuring of the federal 
ministries in 2019. The Secretariat of Productivity, Employment, and Competitiveness in the Ministry of Labor is 





As a percentage of the total budget for all active labor market programs, spending on 
labor intermediation services in Brazil is low compared to OECD countries:  Brazil spends less 
than 2 percent on labor intermediation services, while OECD countries spend an average of 10 
percent (Silva et al. 2015). Since the PES provides services free of charge, it also improves 
equity in access to social participation through the labor market. Although not an explicitly 
stated organizational objective, the movement of workers from informal to formal sector jobs by 
PES might provide access to private health insurance and other benefits. Even if labor 
intermediation does not have a significant effect on aggregate employment, it can help maintain 
the attachment of the long-term unemployed to the labor force, thereby decreasing their 
dependence on social assistance programs.  
Considering the importance of public employment services, the paucity of research on 
program effectiveness in developing countries is remarkable. The studies conducted in the 
United States and Europe consistently find evidence for public labor exchange services in those 
developed countries to be a positive (Johnson et al. 1985; Blundell et al. 2004; Michaelides and 
Mueser 2018). While the estimated impacts on employment and earnings are typically small, the 
low cost of interventions often makes PES job search assistance services cost effective. 
The few studies from Latin American showing causal evidence from survey data contain 
mixed results. Vera (2013), based on a small survey of 150 job applicants, finds that participation 
in the PES in Peru lengthens unemployment spells by 33 days. Pignatti (2016), utilizing a 
nationwide survey for Colombia, finds that the Colombian PES increased participants’ likelihood 
of having a formal job by between 5 and 31 percentage points but had a small negative effect on 






While high-quality statistics on the administration of nationwide programs in labor 
intermediation in Brazil exist, to date there has not been a formal impact evaluation. This paper 
is the first study in Latin America to use a large body of data to produce a more robust evaluation 
of a labor intermediation service. Using administrative microdata from 2012 to 2016, our study 
combines propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimators to assess the impact 
of SINE’s job referral on labor market outcomes. These difference-in-difference estimations 
show that a job referral by SINE increases employment probability within the next three months 
and reduces the number of months until employment. However, we also find that SINE referrals 
decrease the average tenure and salary of the next job. Our paper shows two other things: 1) 
SINE’s impact differs according to its use by different subgroups, and 2) web-based job 
interview referrals contribute to the placement of workers but are less effective than face-to-face 
services in shortening nonemployment spells. Such knowledge helps administrators design 
strategies to make labor intermediation services better.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background on 
related literature. Section 3 gives a description of data and summary statistics. Section 4 details 






 Previous researchers give us mixed evidence on the effectiveness of work intermediation 
programs. Evaluations of the PES have focused mainly on the service’s impacts on employment 
probability, unemployment duration, and earnings. Specifically, some papers attempt to estimate 
national average employment impacts. One of the earliest attempts to assess the impact of job 
interview referrals in the United States is provided by Johnson et al. (1985), who use 
observational data from program administrative records to evaluate the effect of referrals to job 
interviews made by local offices of the U.S. Employment Service (ES). They identify the 
program effect by matching on observable characteristics. A subsample of ES registrants not 
given a job referral was selected by matching on observable characteristics to those whom the ES 
had referred to job interviews. The authors find significant positive effects on women’s return to 
work, including the probability of employment six months after the job interview referral, the 
probability of remaining in the labor force, and earnings. However, the effect of an ES job 
interview referral for men was insignificant. The authors suggest that this result can be explained 
by the barriers women face compared to men in accessing other job finding methods. Matching 
on observables provides modest causal evidence. 
A more recent study in the U.S. found positive effects from job interview referrals in 
randomized controlled trials (Michaelides and Mueser 2018).  A field experiment in Nevada 
during the Great Recession randomly assigned to eligibility assessment and job search assistance 
UI applicants identified as likely to exhaust benefits.  The job search assistance included skills 
assessment, resume preparation, job interview coaching, and interview referrals to employers 
with openings suited to the applicants’ skills.  The control group had to meet no requirements to 





percent lower rate of exhausting regular unemployment benefits and an average 7.0 and 8.2 
percentage point higher reemployment rate one and two quarters after treatment assignment, 
respectively.  The employment gain diminished but remained positive during six observable 
post-referral quarters. 
In a European study, Blundell et al. (2004) use differences in the geographic rollout and 
demographic targeting of services to convincingly identify the effect of the New Deal for Young 
People, which formed the largest part of the New Deal, a workfare program introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1998. The New Deal provided compulsory job search assistance to 
unemployment compensation applicants and wage subsidies to employers. The authors provide 
causal evidence that the program increased the probability of young men finding a job in the next 
four months by 5 percentage points. This impact was larger at the beginning of the New Deal 
program and diminished over time, perhaps because of displacement effects. 
Crépon et al. (2013) use randomized controlled trials in a field experiment to measure the 
impacts of job placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young, educated job 
seekers in France. They provide strong causal evidence to show that even though the program 
increases the likelihood of finding a stable job, the positive effect diminishes over time and often 
comes at the expense of other eligible workers. Crépon et al. suggest that French job placement 
assistance has little net effect on overall unemployment in the country. However, unlike the UK 
and French cases, the SINE in Brazil facilitates only about 3 percent of job placements, 
suggesting that displacement effects are a smaller concern.   
A study by Launov and Wälde (2016) uses program changes to identify the impacts of the 
Hartz reforms in Germany, which dealt with unemployment benefits programs and job 





nationwide by 0.88 percentage points. Notably, these reforms turned out to favor long-term 
unemployed workers at the expense of newly unemployed workers, even though the long-term 
unemployed are regarded as particularly hard to serve. Changes in job placement methods had 
the biggest effect, as the authors estimate that employment-agency changes explain about 20 
percent of the decline in unemployment, while unemployment benefit reductions explain only 
about 5 percent.   
There are few studies evaluating the effectiveness of PES agencies in South America.  
Vera (2013) conducted one study in Peru using a quasi-experimental design. She finds that job 
search assistance provided by the Peruvian PES had only small impacts on unemployment spells 
compared to job search assistance from private agencies. Vera suggests that the weak effects of 
PES result from barriers such as the limited geographic coverage of PES offices, the large 
informal sector, low use of the PES by highly skilled persons, high job turnover, lack of 
unemployment benefits, and little confidence in public-sector institutions. However, her research 
design has important limitations for generating convincing causal evidence: the treated sample is 
based on information on the beneficiaries of the program collected from a survey distributed to 
only 150 job applicants whom the PES had placed in a job in September 2004.  
Pignatti (2016) uses propensity score matching to identify causal effects of job 
placements by the Colombian PES compared to job placements by other means such as private 
agencies, public posting of job openings, newspaper or website advertisements, or family and 
friends. Using data from the annual household survey (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares) 
conducted by the National Administrative Department for Statistics (Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística) in 24 municipalities and all rural areas, the study finds 





formal-sector job, since two-thirds of PES placements are in large companies. It further finds that 
PES placements reduce earnings; however, this overall result obscures the more detailed finding 
that earnings impacts are positive for low-skilled workers but negative for high-skilled workers. 
A limitation to the identification strategy is that Pignatti’s (2016) data is based on a sample of 
PES users from a general household survey that does not have a panel structure and does not 
provide detailed information on previous job-search history.   
Our paper relies on the full population of PES users in Brazil, merged to RAIS (Relação 
Anual de Informações Sociais––Annual Social Information Report) longitudinal data on 
employment and earnings. It is, to our knowledge, the most complete evaluation of labor 
intermediation conducted in Latin America. Therefore, while Pignatti’s analysis cannot directly 
investigate the effects of program participation on the probability of finding a job, we are able to 
do so, since our unique data set allows us to follow job seekers’ labor history, both prior to and 
following the SINE job interview referral.  
Only one prior study has attempted to assess the effectiveness of job interview referrals 
on different groups of participants in Brazil. In that study, Woltermann (2002) finds that the only 
significant channels for transition into formal-sector jobs were these three: 1) directly contacting 
the employer, 2) using connections through family and friends, and 3) responding to 
advertisements. Nevertheless, the study is based on the monthly employment surveys (PME) 
collected by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and does not include 
data from Brazilian employment services. 
 Thus, the existing literature in Latin America does not provide a comprehensive impact 
evaluation of the effectiveness of labor intermediation programs on employment probability, 





understand the effectiveness of these nationwide labor market programs in the Latin American 
context, using data from Brazil. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 We constructed a unique data set, merging administrative data from the SINE with data 
from the RAIS to analyze the effectiveness of labor intermediation in Brazil. The SINE was 
established in 1975 as a public agency for labor market programs, including the labor exchange. 
Its original purpose was to promote labor intermediation, but currently its services include 
professional orientation, referral to qualification and training programs, job placement, labor 
market information, issuance of formal worker-identification credentials, and managing some 
components of the UI program, including payment of benefits.4 
The intermediation process involves the registration of workers and employers, recording 
information on the employment histories of job seekers, and solicitation and listing of job 
vacancies. The process of SINE labor intermediation begins with job search registration at a 
SINE office or online through the SINE website. Based on information in the SINE database, the 
labor exchange officer explores the possible job matches between the profiles of registered job 
seekers and listings of available jobs.  The SINE job-matching expert then presents job interview 
opportunities to the job seeker that match his or her skills and experience profile and proceeds to 
offer any suitable  job-interview referrals.5  Since May 2014, the SINE job-interview referral 
system also allows job seekers to make an online self referral if the worker meets the minimum 
requirements listed by the employer in the job-vacancy posting.6  Thus, the SINE labor 
 
4 See the following web page for more details: http://portalfat.mte.gov.br/programas-e-acoes-2/sistema-nacional-de-
emprego-sine/. 
5 A worker that is a beneficiary of the unemployment-insurance benefit cannot refuse an interview referral without 
having an acceptable excuse (Federal Law No. 7.998 from 1990).  
6 In 2016, online self-referral accounted for 16 percent of the total number of referrals (see Table 1). The policy note 





intermediation process entails matching job-seeker profiles with the requirements of vacancies, 
referring workers to interviews based on the matching results, and capturing referral outcomes, 
which we use in this evaluation.  
SINE’s intermediation service also involves the management of job vacancy listings from 
the moment they are received to the moment they are filled or expire. The SINE database, used 
for the first time in the literature, contains socioeconomic information on workers taken from 
their registration forms (age, gender, education, and employment status), as well as information 
on employers and records of available job vacancies and job interview referrals (status of the 
referral, employer feedback, and type of service offered). The SINE database includes the 
individual’s unique identification number—Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas (CPF)—and allows us 
to track job seekers during the period of analysis. 
The SINE data are complemented by RAIS annual administrative data compiled by the 
Labor Ministry of Brazil. These contain employment and earnings information on all formal 
firms and employed workers in a given year.7 All formally registered firms in Brazil report 
annual information on their employees. The RAIS includes detailed information about the 
employer, the employee, and the employment relationship (wage, tenure, type of employment, 
hiring and separation dates, and reason for separation, among other facts). Importantly, RAIS is 
an employer-employee matched data set that can be linked to the SINE data set using CPF. 
For this paper, the RAIS data were available from 2011 through 2016. The RAIS data set 
is structured so that each observation represents an employment relationship containing the dates 
of hiring and separation. We use these data to construct a monthly panel with information on 
 
7 Severance payments are based on RAIS records; thus, employers and workers have a strong incentive to submit the 






each individual’s employment status for that month. Our aim is to analyze the exit from 
unemployment (nonformal employment) of workers with past experience in formal-sector jobs.8 
The panel data allow us to observe workers with more than one job at the same time—i.e., 
multiple jobholders. Since job loss for a multiple jobholder does not result in full unemployment, 
our sample excludes workers who at some point had multiple simultaneous formal-sector jobs.9  
Since most workers who seek SINE’s assistance are unemployed (94 percent), we restrict 
the analysis to workers who were separated from their jobs at some point before a job interview 
referral. In the panel based on RAIS information, a period between jobs is a period of 
nonemployment in the formal sector. Using the separation and hiring dates in RAIS, we create a 
panel of individuals with formal employment histories and at least one nonemployment spell in 
the formal sector.10  
Overall, the study addresses unemployed individuals who were never multiple jobholders 
in the period analyzed, but who had at least one job in the RAIS before a job interview referral. 
However, a job after the interview referral is used when the outcome requires this observation 
(e.g., reemployment wages, tenure in the next job).11 The unemployment (or nonformal 
employment) periods correspond to the  periods for individuals who were hired at some point 
during the time span of the panel after being separated. The resulting panel includes 30 million 
unemployment spells, 29 million workers, and about 5 million individuals per month before the 
 
8 Outcomes are measured using RAIS records that only encompass formal workers. 
9 Simultaneous jobs are defined as two or more jobs with durations (start and end dates) overlapping in time. This 
guarantees the fulfillment of the assumption that the period following a dismissal is, in fact, a state of formal 
employment. 
10 RAIS data include formal-sector workers. We refer to nonemployment in the formal sector as unemployment. 
11 We observe that a person who gets a referral in 2012 has a 90 percent probability of finding a formal job within 
the next five years. This means that for outcomes that require the observation of a job after the referral, restricting 
the panel to workers with at least one unemployment spell and a registry of formal employment after having been 
referred to a job interview by SINE retains most of the observations in our panel. For the last year of data, about 43 





matching. In this data, we observe about 65,000 job interview referrals each month. The average 
job tenure is less than two years, suggesting that the available five-year time span for the data is 
sufficient, and that monthly analysis is necessary for analysis of job tenure.12   
 Combining the SINE and RAIS data sets allows us to trace the duration of formal 
employment, time until reemployment, and earnings in the new job for individuals who look for 
employment through SINE agencies compared to those who use other job-search methods. Table 
1 provides descriptive statistics on the labor intermediation activities of SINE between 2012 and 
2016. We chose this period because a new data system was established in 2012, and the quality 
and reliability of data improved greatly from that time onward, according to the Ministry of 
Labor. Table 1 shows that the total number of unique workers registered in the SINE system 
reached 31.7 million for the 2012–2016 period.13 While 70 percent of the vacancies14 available 
at SINE have at least one job interview referral, only 28 percent of the vacancies are filled 
through a SINE job referral. The overall placement rate (workers placed by referral) of SINE is 
about 12 percent throughout the period of analysis. Note that online self-service referrals were 






12 The average job tenure in this data is exactly 19.6 months. The average job tenure for the formal private sector in 
Brazil is about 3.5 years, according to the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies 
(DIEESE 2016). 
13 Table 1 shows the number of new SINE registrants per year. For instance, in 2016, 4,587,164 workers that had 
never registered with SINE did so. Thus, 31.7 million is the number of unique workers registered.   
14 In the SINE system, one “vacancy” posted by an employer might represent more than one position. For instance, a 
firm might submit one “vacancy” requiring 10 employees. On average, 3.8 positions are offered per each SINE 
vacancy. This average increases to 5.4 positions per vacancy when taking into account only the “vacancies” with at 






Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics of SINE Labor Intermediation (2012-2016) 







2012 8,231,696 3,072,010 5,937,727 730,489 12 0 
2013 7,480,241 3,597,192 6,745,416 838,320 12 0 
2014 6,232,876 2,715,616 5,834,709 686,295 12 152,444 
2015 5,185,316 1,758,888 4,900,375 616,497 13 243,167 
2016 4,587,164 1,151,366 3,783,357 402,365 11 211,906 
Total 31,717,293 12,295,072 27,201,584 3,273,966 12 607,517 
NOTE: The placement rate is equal to the ratio of workers placed to referrals. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Labor.  
 
To evaluate the impact of labor intermediation, we construct a monthly database with 
matches of referrals to nonreferrals. The data match only one referral each month per individual, 
even if that individual was referred more than once in a month.15  
Table 2 shows that 94 percent of the referrals are made for unemployed job seekers, 
which is the group of workers analyzed in this study.16 The average age of the workers referred 
by SINE is higher for the unemployed than for the employed, and the difference between the two 
groups is around seven years. The mean age of all SINE applicants is about 30 years old. While 
almost 50 percent of the workers are high school graduates, only 11 percent have some college 




15 The placement rate (workers placed by referral) that considers one referral per month is higher (16 percent) 
because the number of workers placed remains the same but the number of referrals is lower than listed in Table 1 
(see Appendix A, Table A1). 
16 The relative number of matches is higher for employed job seekers, with 19 percent effectiveness, compared to 12 
percent of placed workers on referrals made for the unemployed. This means that the chances of one getting a job 
might depend not only on the skills of job seekers, but also on other aspects, such as their employment status 





Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for Job Seekers Referred by SINE, 2015 
  Observations 
  Employed Unemployed 
% observations 6 94 
Age sample means 24.1 31.7 
Race (%)   
   Indigenous 0 0 
   White 38 42 
   Dark 11 12 
   Yellow 1 1 
   Brown 49 45 
Education (%)   
   Illiterate 0 0 
   Middle school dropout/incomplete 9 15 
   Middle school graduate 6 11 
   High school dropout/incomplete 29 14 
   High school graduate 46 49 
   College dropout/incomplete 7 7 
   College graduate 2 3 
   Specialization 0 0 
   Advanced degree/PhD 0 0 
Gender (%)   
   Male 48 58 
   Female 52 42 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Labor. 
 
Brazil is well known for having wide regional variation in cultural and economic matters, 
and these disparities extend to the SINE system. Therefore, in estimating program effects, it is 
important to control for differences across states. Table 3 summarizes regional differences across 
Brazilian states when it comes to the provision of services in SINE offices. The state of Paraná 
lists the most referrals per employment office (44,362) and the most placements per office 
(6,583). However, the placement rate of job seekers in Paraná is only 14.8 percent, since it has a 
high number of job seekers per office. In contrast, Alagoas, with a lower number of referrals per 
office (4,316), has the highest rate of job placements (46.0 percent). Even though São Paulo is 





average (7.2 percent). São Paulo had more than 10 million registered job seekers in the period, 
but with 315 offices, it had only a moderately high number of job referrals per office (27,270). 
These heterogeneities suggest that unmeasured differences across states should be considered in 
the process of estimating the impacts of SINE services.  
 















Acre 80,247 11 8,832 2.008 0.395 19.7 
Alagoas 393,550 43 137,497 4.316 1.984 46.0 
Amapá 83,460 12 12,673 1.461 0.118 8.1 
Amazonas 453,945 29 140,717 5.074 1.428 28.1 
Bahia 1,859,443 149 563,919 9.216 1.962 21.3 
Ceará 931,723 135 643,526 10.014 2.870 28.7 
Dist Federal 501,929 26 233,878 41.793 2.492 6.0 
Espírito Santo 642,186 34 185,039 11.152 0.792 7.1 
Goiás 1,150,209 90 419,242 11.468 1.005 8.8 
Maranhão 552,293 47 49,209 1.990 0.674 33.8 
Mato Grosso 569,393 45 250,436 10.416 2.067 19.8 
Mato Gr do S 442,099 40 198,142 14.060 2.060 14.7 
Minas Gerais 3,066,879 227 821,631 11.275 1.048 9.3 
Pará 832,355 56 79,584 2.125 0.488 23.0 
Paraíba 430,538 40 99,891 5.207 0.716 13.8 
Paraná 1,878,055 87 1,454,639 44.362 6.583 14.8 
Pernambuco 977,721 82 289,921 9.155 1.109 12.1 
Piauí 307,818 31 33,474 1.843 0.254 13.8 
Rio de Janeiro 2,362,499 127 1,013,274 8.708 0.922 10.6 
Rio Gran do N 379,473 38 36,130 2.307 0.195 8.5 
Rio Gran do S 1,791,515 128 662,611 14.273 1.519 10.6 
Rondônia 234,515 20 52050 6.221 0.921 14.8 
Roraima 61,362 7 9,081 5.880 0.800 13.6 
Santa Catarina 1,183,483 74 324,924 9.947 1.026 10.3 
São Paulo 10,045,183 315 4,409,235 27.270 1.970 7.2 
Sergipe 293,09 21 25,949 3.100 0.245 7.9 
Tocantins 212,324 16 139,568 22.394 4.002 17.9 
Total 31,717,287 1,930 12,295,072 14.098 1.697 12.0 






4. Methodology  
 
4.1 The evaluation  
The purpose of this paper, as we have stated, is to estimate the effects of SINE job 
interview referrals on labor market outcomes. That is, we analyze the effect of referrals by SINE 
offices on the labor market outcomes of participants compared to nonparticipants. However, 
simple differences of means between participants and nonparticipants will not yield reliable 
estimates of program effects because the characteristics of the two groups are likely to be 
different, owing to self-selection into SINE registration and services. Thus, we compare the 
outcomes of two groups—one given the treatment and one not given the treatment—to serve as a 
baseline reference.  
The evaluation problem is to compare participants to themselves with and without the 
service. SINE services match workers to vacancies based on a list of criteria, and this automated 
process might be more efficient than workers trying to find a job match by themselves.17 
However, we do not observe the outcome for service recipients had they not received the service.  
In this study, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to construct a counterfactual for the 
treated by selecting a group of nonparticipants who have a similar pretreatment conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment and then estimate group mean effects, or the average 
treatment effect on the treated. The individuals in the matched comparison group will be similar 
to the participants in observed characteristics, except for the referral. Application of PSM 
requires satisfaction of the conditional independence and common support assumptions.18   
 
17 The matching algorithm is based on occupation (up to seven occupations can be listed using the CBO, the 
Brazilian classification of professions), educational attainment, work, language skills, availability for traveling or 
staying away from home for long periods of time, and possession of a driver’s license. 
18 The assumption of conditional independence (selection on observables) requires that, conditionally on a set of 







The propensity scores used to balance characteristics between participant and nonparticipant 
groups are estimated by the following probit model for each group evaluated: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 = 1|𝑋𝑋) = 𝜙𝜙(𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 + 𝛾𝛾(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝐽𝐽𝐴𝐴(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 +
                                          𝑢𝑢𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝐽𝐽𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑢𝑢_𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                 (1) 
In this specification, we calculate the probability of being referred for a job interview, 
P(D=1|X), as a function of observable individual characteristics. Importantly, our data includes 
successive monthly cohorts of participants and their counterfactuals between January 2012 and 
December 2016, and job interview referrals are measured on a year-month reference basis.19 
Using these monthly samples of participants and nonparticipants, we estimate 60 PSM models. 
That is, we estimate separate PSM models on each monthly data set of treated workers in our 
panel.20 We follow the approach of Sianesi (2004), who estimates separate PSM models for each 
month in her panel data.21 We use nearest-neighbor matching within the same state without 
replacement to create comparison groups.22   
 
the (observed) distribution of the nontreatment outcome in the nontreated group. The common support assumption 
requires that all treated individuals have a counterpart in the nontreated population. This means that values of X in 
Equation (1) are related to similar propensity scores in the treatment and control groups. For details, see Blundell et 
al. (2004) and Heinrich et al. (2010).  
19 In other words, we count referrals and registrations in a given month only once. Workers who successfully get 
reemployed are removed from the sample. 
20 For each subgroup analysis performed in Section 5, 60 PSM models were estimated. 
21 Sianesi (2004) evaluated employment services in Sweden and developed this monthly subsample approach, 
because nearly every customer of the employment service gets at least one service at some point.  Constructing 
monthly samples allows for program participants and nonparticipants in each month.  Other job referrals in the same 
month or later months—or other services in later months—could be confounding factors in our evaluation design. 
Therefore, we assume that the distribution of receiving subsequent employment and training services is balanced 
between referrals and comparison group members.   
22 The use of the closest match minimizes the bias, as we guarantee the use of the most similar observation to 
construct the counterfactual (Heinrich et al. 2010). In other words, the match uses the closest propensity score to 
match one worker in the treatment group to a worker in the comparison group. We used the nearest matching 
without replacement, meaning workers in the control group are used only once as a match. Matching without 
replacement performs well when many comparison units overlap with the treatment group (Dehejia and Wahba 
2002). There is a large availability of observations in the control group, and Appendix B shows that treatment and 





The term ϕ is the normal cumulative distribution function. The remaining observable 
individual characteristics in the vector X for the PSM are as follows: tenure of the last job before 
referral (in terms of months), the logarithm of the average monthly salary on the last job, race 
(divided into five categories: indigenous, white, dark, yellow, and brown), age in the year of the 
matching, gender, educational attainment (divided into 11 categories), industrial sector (86 
categories of CNAE23 at the two-digit level) and occupational group (48 categories of CBOat the 
two-digit-level) in the person’s last job, and number of months unemployed.24 In addition, as 
shown in Equation (1), age, job tenure, wage, gender, and unemployment duration are interacted 
with region dummies.25 Tenure on the last job before referral (months) and the logarithm of the 
average monthly salary on the last job were included in the PSM to reduce selection on 
unobservables, as these variables encompass information on unobservables (Heinrich et al. 
2010).  
We use two strategies to construct control groups, based on the probability of being 
referred for a job interview. First, we construct control groups using the pool of workers that 
registered at a SINE office but were not referred for a job interview in a given month. This 
approach mitigates selection bias on unobservables, since workers who visit a SINE office might 
have self-selected and received a job interview referral due to unobservable characteristics, such 
as their level of self-motivation and general proactiveness. Alternative control groups are 
constructed based on a broader pool of workers available in the RAIS at any point of our panel 
 
23 CNAE is the national classification of economic activities.  
24 As the large number of observations allows, we also estimated an alternative PSM whereby individuals are 
matched with certainty on two characteristics: 1) number of months unemployed until matching and 2) the workers’ 
state of residence. Thus, each treated individual is matched with a nontreated individual from the same state—
someone who also has the exact number of months unemployed until matching. These additional results are 
available upon request. The strategy of matching on exact characteristics is used by Lechner (2002), who performs 
matching using propensity scores and matching exactly on sex, duration of unemployment, and native language. 





who were not referred for job interviews using SINE services. These control groups are more 
subject to selection bias, as most workers who are in RAIS do not visit a SINE office.26 Thus, 
our main results, presented in the body of this paper, are based on the control groups applying 
the first strategy. Additionally, we require the common support condition to be met exactly. Our 
results for the alternate control groups are presented in Appendix A.  
 After estimating propensity score models, the next step is to perform the matching and 
assess its quality. The literature suggests that observable characteristics should be balanced 
between the two groups after matching. As the matching is performed monthly, the balance in 
the means of basic obervable characteristics must be checked for each month. Table 4 shows the 
t-tests for differences in means before and after the matching for certain characteristics in 
November 2016. The bias for a given variable is defined as the difference between the means of 
participant and comparison groups, scaled by the average variance. A bias reduction after 
matching is expected. The t-tests show that before matching, the participant and comparison 
groups are sigificantly different on most observable characteristics, but that after matching there 
are fewer significant differences. This suggests that the participant and nonparticipant matched 




26 The information used in the PSM to construct control groups always comes from RAIS. What differs is that the 
first strategy to construct control groups uses only workers registered at SINE, while the second strategy uses the 
broader pool of workers from RAIS who did not visit a SINE office. While the main database used to compare the 
referred vs. nonreferred individuals was the SINE, information from the RAIS was essential to calculate PSMs and 






Table 4 – Selected Descriptive Statistics Pre- and Post-Matching 
Treatment Group: Referrals | Control Group: SINE, January 2016 
Variable   Sample   Mean   % bias 
% bias  
reduction t-test P>|t| 
        Treated Control      
              
Male   Unmatched   0.549 0.583  7.05    20.064  0.00 
   Matched   0.584 0.580  0.64  90.89  1.461  0.14 
Age   Unmatched   31.474 32.831  12.58    36.922  0.00 
   Matched   32.864 32.862  −0.27  97.78  −0.635  0.53 
Tenure last job   Unmatched   24.073   15.594  −28.23    −94.025  0.00 
   Matched   15.554   15.842  −1.126  96.00  −2.564  0.01 
Mean wage last job (ln) Unmatched   7.102     7.141  8.238     25.526  0.00 
 Matched   7.143     7.144  −0.666  91.90    −1.517  0.13 
White   Unmatched   0.445 0.460  2.914    8.263  0.00 
   Matched   0.459 0.461  −0.151  94.81  −0.343  0.73 
Elementary incomplete   Unmatched   0.029 0.031  1.518    4.260  0.00 
   Matched   0.032 0.030  0.834  45.01  1.899  0.06 
Elementary complete   Unmatched   0.031 0.030  −0.366    −1.042  0.30 
   Matched   0.030 0.030  −0.347  −0.79  −0.790  0.43 
Middle incomplete   Unmatched   0.081 0.085  1.550    4.371  0.00 
   Matched   0.085 0.084  0.020  98.66  0.047  0.96 
Middle complete   Unmatched   0.133 0.135  0.511    1.449  0.15 
   Matched   0.135 0.151  −4.646  −808.64  −10.575  0.00 
High school incomplete   Unmatched   0.165 0.126  −11.152    −32.558  0.00 
   Matched   0.126 0.152  −7.481  32.68  −17.026  0.00 
High school complete   Unmatched   0.478 0.542  12.467    35.405  0.00 
   Matched   0.540 0.499  8.433  32.35  19.192  0.00 
College incomplete   Unmatched   0.026 0.022  −2.659    −7.721  0.00 
   Matched   0.022 0.017  3.591  −35.07  8.173  0.00 
College complete   Unmatched   0.048 0.023  −13.518    −42.486  0.00 
   Matched   0.023 0.027  −2.541  81.19  −5.784  0.00 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Labor. 
 
The matching does not necessarily need to be balanced in all variables to be satisfactory, 
and we use the mean standardized bias to formally assess the quality of the PSM. If observable 





expected that the mean standardized bias between control and treatment groups will be 
significantly reduced. According to empirical studies, a final bias below 5 percent after matching 
should be sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The dots in Figure 1 represents the value of 
the mean standardized bias calculated separately for each of the 60 months. In this case, the bias 
maintains an average value of 1.7 after the matching, an indication of the good quality of the 
PSM.27 An additional step to verify the matching quality is to examine the kernel density 
distribution graphs of the propensity score for the two groups before and after matching—see 
Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B. These figures show that there is an overlap in the mean 
propensity scores and their distributions for the two groups after matching, suggesting that the 





27 We also use the Rubin ratio test (see Rubin 2001), and the results confirm the quality of the matching, as the ratio 
of variances of the propensity score and covariates from the treatment and comparison groups is close to 1.0, and it 
is between 0.5 and 2.0 for each of the 60 months (see Figure B3 in the appendix).  
28 The PSM is conducted for each month of our panel, and the kernel densities present a similar pattern in every 







Mean Standardized Bias between Control and Treatment Groups 
Post-Matching  
 
NOTE: For the five years of data, 60 monthly propensity-score matched pair samples were constructed.  We 
computed the mean standardized bias between each monthly pair of participant and comparison group samples 
based on outcomes measured in the following month.  Therefore, Figure 1 graphically displays 59 mean 
standardized bias estimates. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
We use the participant and comparison groups constructed by propensity score matching 
to measure impacts on the following labor market outcomes: employment, time from registration 
until employment, job tenure, and reemployment monthly earnings. As described in Section 3, to 
perform the matching, we restricted the database to workers who had lost their jobs prior to 
SINE job referral, which allowed us to calculate the pre- and post-matching variables. Details on 
the calculation of the resulting outcomes (pre- and post-treatment) are provided below. 
4.2 Measuring SINE impact on labor market outcomes  
Having constructed counterfactual groups for workers who had a SINE job interview 





constructed counterfactual groups in the following difference-in-difference specification to 
estimate the impact of a job interview referral on labor market outcomes for worker i: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝜑𝜑 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟+𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝐽𝐽𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 (2) 
where Yit stands for one of the four outcome measures for individual i and time t. Employment 
within 3 months of referral establishes whether at the month of the matching the worker had 
gotten a job within three months of the referral. In the evaluation, this variable is always 0 for the 
pre-matching period.29 Time until employment is unemployment time between jobs, calculated as 
the date of admission to the next job minus the date of separation from the previous job.30 Mean 
tenure is the tenure in the next job, and reemployment wage is the natural logarithm of real 
wages after the matching, compared to the last job before the matching.31  
 The term 𝜑𝜑 captures all time-constant factors that affect the outcome. 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the individual gets a SINE job referral or not, and Post takes 
the value of 1 after treatment. The variable SINE is the interaction between 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 and Post, 
whereas 𝜃𝜃, the coefficient of interest, measures the difference in the outcome variable between 
the treated and control groups before and after receiving services from SINE. 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 are the monthly 
dummy variables. The matrix X includes alternative education and sector variables for individual 
 
29 To evaluate this outcome, we remove matches from September 2016 onward in order to leave only observations 
that are well defined (individuals who possess at least three months of information for this outcome). 
30 Unemployment (nonformal employment) is calculated as the time between two jobs prior to the treatment. The 
calculation of the outcome time until employment requires information on two jobs prior to the job referral, 
generating a smaller number of observations for the regressions for this outcome. No further restrictions are 
imposed.  
31 The data for mean tenure and reemployment wages requires the observation of one job prior to and after matching 
to measure the outcomes; no further restrictions are imposed. As opposed to the method used for the calculation of 
the time until employment, the information on job tenure is observed in the record of employment prior to matching 





workers who are not included in the PSM.32 We also include information on whether the worker 
is a beneficiary of UI, dummies for the nth UI payment, and total number of referrals.33 
5. Results  
 
5.1 Overall Results 
The analysis seeks to measure the effect of referrals on the probability of workers’ 
finding a job within three months of the referral. It also looks at time until employment, the mean 
tenure of the next job, and the reemployment salary, comparing these outcomes to those of 
workers who were registered at SINE but did not get a job referral.34  
The results in Table 5 show that the treatment increases the likelihood of finding a job 
within three months of the referral by 20.0 percentage points. The probability of the control-
group participants finding a job within three months is 24 percent; thus, a SINE interview 
referral nearly doubles their probability of finding a job within that time.35 In addition, job 
seekers who are referred by SINE take less time (0.5 months less) to find a job than those who 
are not referred. This represents about a 6 percent reduction in the waiting time until they are 
able to secure a job, as in the control group the wait time is 8.00 months on average. However, 
SINE job referrals have a negative impact on the mean tenure of the next job found. On average, 
job tenure is reduced by 3.5 months, which equates to a 18 percent reduction in the average job 
 
32 Education is disaggregated into three categories: 1) unskilled (from illiterate to completed primary school), 2) 
semiskilled (incomplete and completed high school), and 3) skilled (from incomplete undergraduate education to 
PhD). The sector of the last job from the IBGE classification is aggregated in the following categories: agriculture, 
industry, services, trade, construction, and other.    
33 These variables are included in the difference-in-difference estimations, as they were not available when the main 
bulk of PSM was calculated. Alternative estimations including these variables in the PSM or difference-in-
difference estimations, without the variables included in vector X, provide similar results.   
34 Results using RAIS for control groups are very similar and are provided in Appendix C.  
35 Appendix D provides an indication on the size of SINE’s impact on outcomes. For instance, 0.24 percent of 
workers in the control group obtained a job within three months after matching, and SINE increased this probability 





tenure of 19.6 months found in the data.36 Finally, being treated by SINE reduces wages by 
about 5.8 percent. This result is consistent with Pignatti (2016) and Vera (2013) and may be 
related to stigmatization effects on SINE participants or the lack of capacity in the program to 
attract high-paying enterprises to the system.37 The estimated effects are the average for the 
period of analysis, and because of the short job-tenure duration and high worker turnover in the 
Brazilian labor market, the five-year time span is sufficient to provide results about how SINE 
affects labor market outcomes.38 Subgroup analysis based on workers’ characteristics is provided 
in the next section. 












Effect from SINE 
(relative to control) 
0.200*** −0.452** −3.533*** −0.0580*** 
(0.0102) (0.173) (0.233) (0.00605) 
Observations 20,359,236 9,233,184 14,738,524 14,699,527 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.  
 
5.2 Demographic Subgroup Analyses 
Subgroup estimates reveal differences in the impacts of SINE services across groups of 
customers. These estimates help shape the strategy for providing services to workers with 
 
36 See footnote 13. 
37 We used PSM to match firms that posted vacancies at SINE in 2015 and firms that did not. Matching variables 
were the proportion of males, proportion of white workers, average worker age, firm size, sector classification, and 
state of the firm. This exercise suggests that wages at a firm that posts vacancies at SINE are 140 Brazilian reais 
lower than wages at a similar firm that does not post vacancies at SINE. Other results indicating that SINE referrals 
decrease the time to reemployment but also reduce salary and time of employment need further investigation, as 
getting a job faster may be related to a worse quality of matching. Nevertheless, the overall data do not provide a 
clear correlation between time until employment and tenure/salary. 
38 Appendix E, Table E1, provides separate estimates for each year. Results are similar for the initial years of the 
panel, when there is a longer time span for the outcomes to materialize in. Results for the latter years of the sample, 
particularly for 2016, go in the same direction but are biased, as they are influenced by a shorter time span in which 





different characteristics. Our methodology for estimating subgroup impacts involves estimating 
separate PSM for each subgroup category in each of the 60 months, using these to create 
matched-pair comparison groups for each subgroup category, then estimating the effects of job 
referrals by DID for each subgroup category.39  Procedures for constructing samples to measure 
each of the four outcomes follow the same steps as listed in the methodology section. Impact 
estimates for subgroups defined by characteristics of age, sex, race, and educational attainment 
are presented in Table 6. 
The general pattern of effect estimates on outcomes for each subgroup is similar to the 
full sample pattern of impact estimates presented in Table 5:  that is, an increased percentage 
employed within three months of job interview referral, fewer months until reemployment, fewer 
months of job tenure in the new job, and lower reemployment earnings. However, there are some 
significant differences in impact estimates between some subgroup categories.    
By age group, the size of the positive effects of SINE referrals on the time to find a job 
are smallest for the youngest (18‒24). Indeed, the youngest group has a significantly smaller 
positive effect than all age groups.40 The effect on shortening the time until reemployment is 
significantly greater for the oldest (55‒64) group and significantly smaller for the prime age 
groups (25‒34; 35‒44), with no significant differences in effects between the age groups of 25‒
 
39 The effects across groups and overall effects are not directly compared, as the DID estimations and PSMs are 
conducted separately for each subgroup (e.g., comparing women who get interview referrals to women who do not 
get interview referrals) to allow for the best matching and estimations against each control group. Alternative results 
for the full model, based on one general PSM, and estimations of subgroup effects in the same regression, are 
provided upon request. Complete models are estimated for gender, education, age, race, and receipt of 
unemployment insurance. Estimating coefficients in the same regression allows for a better comparison across 
different groups and across different tests of the equality of coefficients; however, it provides poorer matching, as 
those treated in subgroups might be matched with a control that belongs to another subgroup.  
40 The results for the age group between 55 and 64 is influenced by retirement, as Brazil’s average retirement ages is 
56 years for men and 53 years for women. A minimum number of years of contribution to the system provided 
eligibility for pensions, irrespective of age, because of legislation in place during the period analyzed in this paper 





34, 35‒44, and 45‒54. The effects on decreasing tenure in the new job grow steadily larger with 
age. These effects are significantly different between each of the five age groups: the smallest 
effect of 2.76 fewer months occurs in the youngest age group (18‒24), and the largest effect of 
6.95 fewer months occurs in the oldest age group (55‒64).  Job referrals reduced reemployment 
wages the most for the younger prime-age workers (25‒34), at a rate of 5.9 percent. This 
reduction is significantly larger than for the youngest workers (18‒24), who had a rate of 4.1 
percent. Reemployment earnings reductions for the three older age groups declined with age, 
falling from 5.6 percent (35‒44) to 5.2 percent (45‒54), to 5.0 percent (55‒64).   
By gender, the impact of a SINE job interview referral had significantly better effects for 
men than for women on the probability of finding a job. For men, the increase in the probability 
of reemployment within three months is larger—27 percentage points, compared to 24 
percentage points for women. On the other hand, SINE reduces women’s time until employment 
by 3.8 months, as opposed to 3.1 months for men. There were no appreciable differences 
between the genders in the reduction in reemployment job tenure or the reduction in 
reemployment earnings.    
Considering differences in impacts by race, SINE job referrals had generally better 
impacts for nonwhites than for whites. There was no difference by race in the impact on the 
probability of employment within three months, although the time to reemployment was reduced 
more for whites than for nonwhites. However, the reduction in new job tenure was bigger for 
whites, as was the reduction in reemployment wages. RAIS is an administrative database in 
which employers classify the race of employees based on subjective criteria. This can be 
particularly problematic in a country as diverse as Brazil. Paixão et al. (2012) and Câmara (2015) 





differences are significant, as RAIS presents a higher proportion of whites than PNAD and the 
census.41 Using RAIS data, Cornwell et al. (2017) show that when a worker changes jobs, the 
new employer might report a different race than the previous employer, and differences in race 
reporting are systematically associated with variation in wages. Thus, our results by race must be 
interpreted with caution. 
Most workers (90 percent) who seek SINE’s support have at least completed secondary 
education. While there is self-selection in the level of educational attainment, simple subgroup 
differences in impacts on employment outcomes by educational attainment help to inform 
decisions on program refinement. We grouped educational attainment into three categories: 1) 
unskilled (from illiterate to completing primary school), 2) semiskilled (some high school 
attendance or completion), and 3) skilled (beyond high school through completion of an 
advanced degree). Most job referrals (80 percent) went to semiskilled workers, while only 10 
percent were in the skilled group. The magnitude of the effect of job referrals on the probability 
of finding a job within three months decreases signficantly as educational attainment increases. 
This means that, relatively, SINE job referrals benefit less-skilled job seekers the most. While 
their effects were not significantly different from those of semiskilled and skilled job seekers, the 
unskilled did see bigger reductions in the time until reemployment. The semiskilled had the 
smallest reductions in reemployment job tenure, significantly smaller than for skilled job seekers, 
but not very different from the unskilled. The impact on reemployment wages of a SINE job 
referral was significantly smaller for the unskilled (−1.9 percent) than for the semiskilled (−6.1 
 
41 Paixão et al. (2012) show that RAIS, in 2009, identifies 61.2 percent of individuals as white, while PNAD 
identifies 54.7 percent of workers as white. Câmara (2015) shows that 2010 RAIS data identifies 60 percent of 
workers as white, and the 2010 census only identifies 53 percent of workers as white. Race in the RAIS data 






percent) and the skilled (−23.5 percent).  The negative effect on the wages of the highly skilled 
might signal incapacity on the part of SINE to attract high-quality vacancies. As other 
researchers have found for other countries, our evidence suggests SINE job referrals are 
particularly valuable for the unskilled.    
 
Table 6  Estimates of SINE Job Interview Referral Impacts on Four Outcomes by 













AGE 18‒24 0.226*** −2.330*** −2.096*** −0.0414*** 
(0.012) (0.103) (0.116) (0.003) 
Observations 3,928,116 1,761,790 2,657,300 2,649,949 
AGE 25‒34 0.267*** −3.107*** −2.762*** −0.0592*** 
(0.008) (0.108) (0.240) (0.006) 
Observations 8,366,676 4,570,504 5,728,910 5,713,302 
AGE 35‒44 0.265*** −3.185*** −3.398*** −0.0556*** 
(0.009) (0.127) (0.449) (0.008) 
Observations 4,808,100 2,431,800 3,041,026 3,032,629 
AGE 45‒54 0.254*** −3.105*** −4.919*** −0.0523*** 
(0.009) (0.152) (0.584) (0.009) 
Observations 2,416,680 1,130,826 1,401,982 1,398,012 
AGE 55‒64 0.242*** −3.884*** −6.950*** −0.0502*** 
(0.010) (0.185) (0.488) (0.010) 
Observations 779,760 337,192 391,184 390,046 
MALE 0.275*** −3.180*** −4.028*** −0.0639*** 
(0.009) (0.094) (0.365) (0.009) 
Observations 11,707,680 6,339,806 7,858,306 7,837,233 
FEMALE 0.238*** −3.836*** −4.213*** −0.0654*** 
(0.009) (0.124) (0.303) (0.005) 
Observations 8,678,488 3,684,396 5,363,858 5,348,523 
WHITE 0.260*** −3.750*** −4.503*** −0.0778*** 
(0.011) (0.138) (0.366) (0.008) 
Observations 9,585,256 4,642,246 6,250,658 6,232,846 
NONWHITE 0.259*** −3.207*** −3.696*** −0.0516*** 





Observations 10,800,780 5,392,306 6,968,744 6,950,172 
UNSKILLED 0.287*** −3.686*** −4.237*** −0.0191** 
(0.010) (0.184) (0.485) (0.008) 
Observations 3,368,556 1,679,206 2,144,906 3,368,556 
SEMI-SKILLED 0.254*** −3.400*** −3.952*** −0.0614*** 
(0.009) (0.100) (0.318) (0.006) 
Observations 16,202,160 7,965,430 10,577,488 10,549,066 
SKILLED 0.240*** −3.304*** −5.765*** −0.235*** 
(0.011) (0.162) (0.399) (0.014) 
Observations 815,440 398,982 503,476 502,265 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.3 Effects by Unemployment Insurance Recipiency and Unemployment Duration 
The analysis based on unemployment insurance (UI) status is relevant because the 
effectiveness of the service for UI beneficiaries might be different, and there is evidence that 
access to UI affects incentives for formal employment. Tatsiramos (2014) points out that UI 
systems can increase reservation wage and lead to longer unemployment spells. However, UI 
benefits can provide the conditions for UI beneficiaries to increase the quality of the job found. 
Furthermore, Carvalho et al. (2018), Van Doornik et al. (2018), and Cravo et al. (2020) find that 
Brazil’s formal-sector workers who have access to UI have the ability and incentives to induce 
their own dismissal to some extent.  
Table 7 shows the results of the analysis of the effect of SINE referrals on UI 
beneficiaries versus nonbeneficiaries. A SINE job referral has larger impacts on non-UI 
beneficiaries than it does on UI beneficiaries. Non-UI beneficiaries have a significantly higher 
increase in the probability of getting a job within three months of a job referral, and their 
reduction in time until reemployment is larger by a half month; however, the reduction in 
reemployment job tenure is similar for UI and non-UI beneficiaries. Furthermore, the reduction 





referrals for UI beneficiaries might be affected by higher reservation wages, allowing workers to 
look for jobs for longer periods and find a better job match that preserves previous wage levels.42 
The long-term unemployed form an especially vulnerable group of applicants, defined as 
people who have been unemployed for more than 12 months. Results for this group go in the 
same direction of general regressions but show differences in the magnitude of the effects. The 
effect of SINE job referrals is stronger for this group in terms of the likelihood of finding a job 
within three months and the time it takes to get a job, which is 1.6 months shorter than for long-
term unemployed who did not get a SINE job referral. Nevertheless, the negative impact on 
wages is more pronounced for long-term unemployment, as finding a job through a SINE job 
referral reduces wages by about 10 percent. While deeper investigation is warranted, SINE job 
referrals appear to be an effective means of reducing long-term unemployment. 
Thus, the results for the analysis based on unemployment status show heterogeneity in the 
impact of the labor intermediation process. In particular, UI benefits may affect the results of the 
labor intermediation process, which has implications for unemployment spells and the quality of 
the job matching. While deeper investigation is warranted, SINE job referrals appear to be an 





42 Despite efforts of the government to further integrate the labor intermediation and unemployment insurance 
policies, legislation is not effective to induce UI beneficiaries to quickly accept job offers obtained through the labor 
intermediation process. Federal Law No. 12.513, from 2011, states that labor intermediation services and 
unemployment insurance should work in an integrated manner. It indicates that the UI benefit can be canceled in the 
case of a worker not accepting a job that is “suitable” according to the worker’s qualifications and past experiences. 






Table 7  Effects of SINE Referrals by UI Receipt and Unemployment Duration 
  
Employment 















Observations 2,157,364 1,123,086 1,666,510 1,663,046 







Observations 11,483,120 5,808,344 7,532,858 7,510,053 
Long-term 
unemployed 
0.298*** −2.122*** −4.974*** −0.0995*** 
(0.00901) (0.0938) (0.503) (0.0111) 
Observations 7,125,368 2,329,738 4,555,288 4,544,947 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.4 Staff-Assisted versus Self-Service Job Referrals  
 Technology is changing the manner in which public services are provided. Digital 
channels for labor intermediation have been adopeted in many countries; these contribute to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the public employment service. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, 
little empirical evidence is available on how mobile technologies impact labor intermediation 
services and employment outcomes. Dammert et al. (2015) provide one exception and designed 
an experiment to assess the causal impacts of digital public labor-market intermediation in Peru. 
The authors suggest that the use of digital technologies in the public labor intermediation system 
increases the probability of finding employment in the short term.  
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to our knowledge about digital channels 
for labor intermediation and investigates how online and face-to-face systems of service 
provision differ with respect to their effectiveness in placing job seekers in formal jobs, and also 
with respect to the quality of such placements. This is an important aspect of intermediation 





has been on investing in the development of online intermediation platforms as a means to 
increase coverage and reduce costs. Table 8 shows the effect of having SINE online referrals for 
one group versus the effect of using face-to-face referrals for a control group.   
The results from Table 8 show that the probability of getting a job within three months is 
not statistically different if the referral is online. However, the time until employment after the 
referral is 0.6 months longer, suggesting that the face-to-face service is more effective. On the 
other hand, for those who obtain a job, the mean tenure is 0.5 months longer, and the 
reemployment wage is 1 percent higher.  Thus, our results suggest that face-to-face referrals are 
more effective than online service to obtain employment faster, but that job matching seems to 
be more efficient through online services, as reemployment wages are higher and job tenure is 
longer. 
 












Effect from SINE  












Observations 283,872 185,924 198,560 198,079 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Results presented in this table 
should be interpreted with caution because of a shorter time span, as Internet-based referrals only started in 2014.  
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
6 Conclusion  
 This paper relies on the rich administrative records of the National Employment System 





of SINE job interview referrals on four labor market outcomes: the likelihood of reemployment, 
time to reemployment,  job tenure on the new job, and the monthly reemployment wage rate. 
Using data from January 2012 to December 2016, we construct matched pairs 
comparison groups and compute difference-in-difference regressions to measure SINE’s impact 
on the four labor market outcomes. Overall, SINE job interview referrals increase the likelihood 
of reemployment in the first three months following referral and decrease the time to 
reemployment. Being referred by SINE has bigger effects for less-skilled workers than it does 
for more highly skilled workers. 
However, a job interview referral by SINE appears to reduce the job tenure in the new job 
and the monthly salary on that job. Stigmatization effects on program participants or the lack of 
capacity of the PES to attract high-quality job-vacancy postings to the system might be 
contributing to these results.  
The results of our study provide a clearer explanation of how SINE functions, and thus 
can contribute to the design of better labor market policy. The heterogeneity of SINE’s impact on 
different subgroups suggests that providing specific support to each group of customers might 
improve the effectiveness of labor intermediation services. The use of technology in doing job 
interview referrals through the web contributes to the placement of workers, but face-to-face 
services have a greater impact on shortening the time until employment. Thus, there appears to 
be room for technological improvement in the matching algorithm used for online services; such 
improvement could reduce the gap between face-to-face and remote services. A combination of 
services, provided at a SINE office as well as remotely, should be considered to increase the 





The heterogeneus effects of SINE on different groups of customers call for a more 
tailored approach to increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the intermediation 
services. Additional research is needed to understand the most cost-efficient combination of 








Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1 
Effectiveness — Only One Referral per Month 
Year Referrals Placed workers % effectiveness 
2012 4,248,086 719,670 17 
2013 4,811,115 826,112 17 
2014 4,271,055 680,159 16 
2015 3,761,148 610,373 16 
2016 3,023,378 399,137 13 
Total 20,114,782 3,235,451 16 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.   
 
Table A2 
Placed Referrals by Worker Status  
Year 
Employed Unemployed 
Placed % effectiveness Placed % effectiveness 
2012 35,746 16 695,431 12 
2013 39,264 17 799,508 12 
2014 33,390 18 653,215 12 
2015 31,589 20 585,156 12 
2016 29,286 23 373,231 10 








Appendix B: Matching Quality 
 
Figure B1 — Kernel Density, January 2012,  
Control Group from SINE 
 
                                Before PSM                                     After PSM 
 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure B2 — Kernel Density, January 2012,  
Control Group from RAIS 
                                Before PSM                                     After PSM 
 
 







Figure B3 — Rubin R test 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Appendix C: Results from RAIS Control Group 
 
 
Table C5 — Effect of SINE Referrals  








Effect from SINE 
(relative to 
control) 
0.227*** −2.577*** −2.913*** −0.0543*** 
(0.0109) (0.164) (0.231) (0.00535) 
Observations 20,386,188 10,688,984 14,010,724 13,975,252 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. The alternative subgroup 
regressions using the RAIS control group are available upon request. Control group constructed based on 
RAIS data alone. 






Appendix D: Mean Outcomes Post-Matching 
 
Table D1 — Mean Outcomes Post-Matching 
Control Group from SINE 
 
 Control Treatment 
Employment within 3 months  0.24 0.44 
Time until employment (months)  8.00 5.19 
Mean tenure (months)  10.48 6.88 
Reemployment wage (R$)  1,453.18 1,344.66 
NOTE: Means are computed over the whole sample combined over all 60 months for the control and treatment groups 
after propensity score matching in each month. 







Appendix E: Effect of SINE for Referrals by Year 
 
Table E1 — Effect of SINE for Referrals by Year, 2012 to 2016 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Employment  
(within 3 months) 
0.202*** 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.178*** 0.223*** 
(0.0132) (0.00845) (0.00914) (0.0104) (0.00939) 
Observations 3,996,852 4,677,940 4,505,288 4,412,672 2,766,484 
Time until Employment 
(months) 
−1.298*** −1.116*** −0.929*** −0.322 1.265*** 
(0.208) (0.180) (0.231) (0.197) (0.294) 
Observations 1,107,418 1,833,532 2,111,832 2,302,360 1,878,042 
Mean tenure (months) −2.584*** −2.640*** −2.599*** −2.463*** −4.899*** 
 
(0.107) (0.157) (0.204) (0.408) (0.470) 
Observations 3,632,718 4,022,058 3,417,662 2,563,564 1,102,522 
Reemployment Wage (log) −0.0673*** −0.0577*** −0.0454*** −0.0400*** −0.0440*** 
 
(0.00544) (0.00607) (0.00640) (0.00607) (0.00853) 
Observations 3,623,904 4,012,322 3,407,757 2,555,778 1,099,766 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
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